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Abstract
People’s minds frequently wander towards self-generated thoughts, which are unrelated to
external stimuli or demands. These phenomena, referred to as “spontaneous thought” (ST)
and “mind wandering” (MW), have previously been linked with both costs and benefits. Cur-
rent assessments of ST and MW have predominantly been conducted in the laboratory,
whereas studies on the ecological validity of such lab-related constructs and their interrela-
tions are rare. The current study examined the stability of ST dimensions assessed in the
lab and their predictive value with respect to MW, repetitive negative thought (uncontrollable
rumination, RUM), and affect in daily life. Forty-three university students were assessed
with the Amsterdam Resting State Questionnaire (2nd version) to assess ten ST dimensions
during the resting state in two laboratory sessions, which were separated by five days of
electronic ambulatory assessment (AA). During AA, individuals indicated the intensity of
MW and RUM, as well as of positive and negative affect in daily life ten times a day. ST
dimensions measured in the lab were moderately stable across one week. Five out of ten
ST lab dimensions were predicted by mental health-related symptoms or by dispositional
cognitive traits. Hierarchical linear models revealed that a number of ST lab dimensions pre-
dicted cognitive and affective states in daily life. Mediation analyses showed that RUM, but
not MW per se, accounted for the relationship between specific ST lab dimensions and
mood in daily life. By using a simple resting state task, we could demonstrate that a number
of lab dimensions of spontaneous thought are moderately stable, are predicted by mental
health symptoms and cognitive traits, and show plausible associations with categories of
self-generated thought and mood in daily life.
Introduction
People spend a considerable amount of time in their daily lives on thoughts unrelated to exter-
nal stimuli or demands. These phenomena are referred to as”self-generated thought” (SGT),
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“spontaneous thought” (ST) or “mind wandering” (MW) [1–3]. Although these terms are fre-
quently used alternately, we will use the term SGT, i.e. “the capacity for a person to generate
mental contents that are not derived directly from immediate perceptual input” ([1] p. 489), as
an umbrella term for both ST and MW, the term ST when describing task-free self-generated
thoughts during rest, and the term MW when describing task-unrelated self-generated
thoughts during external demands or activities in the following [2]. All forms of SGT are
expressions of human conscious awareness. Whereas SGT can occur whether or not an indi-
vidual is aware of its occurrence (i.e., with and without “meta-awareness” [4, 5], people can
usually indicate if a thought was occurring in their mind, e.g., when interrupted and asked to
do so at a given time point [6].
MW is defined as “a shift of attention away from a primary task toward internal informa-
tion, such as memories” [7]. It is typically studied in laboratory studies using low demanding
sustained attention tasks such as the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART, [8]), a sim-
ple go/no-go task, combined with intermittent thought probes to receive a subjective measure
of MW (i.e., task unrelated thoughts, TUTs [9–11]). Others collect self-report data after com-
pletion of the experimental session to avoid artificial disruptions of the time-course data [1].
MW episodes can also be captured outside the lab during daily life, by, for example, simply
asking people whether they are thinking about something other than what they are currently
doing [12]. Across a variety of laboratory tasks as well as in daily life, research suggests that
15% to 50% of participants’ time is spent mind wandering [1, 7, 9, 12]. Individuals often lack
meta-awareness that their mind has wandered [1, 7, 13, 14], and a substantial number of MW
episodes occur without intent [15, 16].
The resting state is presumed to be a period when high frequencies of ST can occur [7]. It is
defined as a state of relaxed wakefulness, where the mind is free to wander as it is not actively
engaged in any task [13]. Resting-state neuroimaging has revealed that ST is associated with a
specific neural network, the Default Mode Network (DMN). This group of brain regions
shows high activation levels during rest periods, and is especially active during periods of SGT
[1, 14]. McVay and Kane [14] propose that the basic function of the DMN is the continuous
evaluation of life goals and discrepancies, and that it automatically generates a stream of
thought that can enter awareness as SGT episodes. Clinical research has shown that a number
of mental disorders is characterized by abnormalities of DMN activity. For example, acutely
depressed individuals show hyperconnectivity within DMN regions, which is linked to the ten-
dency to ruminate [17, 18].
Studies using experimental tasks to assess associations between SGT in the lab and in daily
life are rare and by now almost exclusively restricted to the investigation of MW episodes [9,
11, 19]. McVay et al. [9] combined the SART procedure with intervening thought probes and
showed that those individuals who reported more MW during the SART task also endorsed
more MW during daily life, particularly with worries as thought content. With a similar low-
demanding lab task, Ottaviani and Couyoumdjian [19] found a positive correlation between
MW in the lab and frequency of MW episodes during daily life one year later. The closeness of
associations between lab-based and daily life-based measures of MW may depend on specific
aspects related to these constructs, such as the complexity of the task employed in the lab, con-
textual features of MW measured in daily life, and intentionality of MW [15, 20]. By using the
SART and the STROOP task, Marcusson-Clavertz et al. [11] found that low performance on
the STROOP task in the lab predicted higher MW in daily life, but only in individuals with a
low positive daydreaming style and when the difficulty of daily life activities was high. Further-
more, Kane et al. [21] showed that individuals with high working memory capacity (WMC)
measured in the lab maintained on-task thoughts better and mind-wandered less in daily life,
but only when the daily life context required concentration and effort. In a subsequent study
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[20], WMC predicted TUTs in the lab as well as MW in daily life as a function of subjects’
momentary attempt to concentrate, thereby confirming prior results. However, TUTs only
marginally predicted daily life MW, whereas they significantly predicted other dimensions of
SGT than MW, such as experiencing their thoughts as hardly to control or racing. The authors
therefore concluded that the relation between lab-based and daily-life based MW is not robust
and that research on SGT might profit from including other qualities of subjective cognitive
experience beyond MW. Finally, Seli et al. [15, 16] provide evidence for the importance to dis-
tinguish between intended and unintended MW, which may differ with regard to their con-
tent, their impact on the level of motivation during a task, and other outcomes. Such a more
detailed elaboration on SGT in the context of MW research is largely missing in the area of
task-free ST. Concomitantly, there is a lack of studies investigating associations between ST in
the lab and SGT in daily life. In this context, we could show previously that provoked DMN
hyperconnectivity by negative mood induction via autobiographical material during scanning
was linked to enhanced daily life rumination in remitted depressed patients [22].
While the resting-state paradigm is frequently employed in neuroimaging studies to assess
task-free ST, Diaz and colleagues [23, 24] developed a retrospective measure of ST which
includes a simple 5-min resting interval in the lab (inside or outside the scanner), followed by
the self-administered Amsterdam Resting-State Questionnaire (ARSQ, [23]). The ARSQ quan-
tifies ST along seven cognitive dimensions or phenotypes: “Discontinuity of Mind”, “Theory
of Mind”, “Self”, “Planning”, “Sleepiness”, “Comfort”, and “Somatic Awareness”. An update of
this questionnaire, the ARSQ 2.0 [24], includes the additional dimensions “Health Concern”,
“Visual Thought”, and “Verbal Thought”. Diaz et al. [24] report satisfying test-retest correla-
tions over short and long time intervals (3–32 months) and significant correlations with the
personality trait of self-directedness for most ARSQ 2.0 dimensions. Stoffers et al. [25] identi-
fied associations of “Sleepiness”, “Visual Thought”, and “Discontinuity of Mind” with func-
tional brain connectivity within visual, sensomotoric, and default mode networks during
resting-state imaging. Marchetti et al. [26] demonstrated that individuals with high values on
the dimension “Theory of Mind” showed higher functional connectivity in the frontal lobe
and in the insula, with a dominance of the left hemisphere, suggesting that connectivity within
the frontal lobes facilitates mentalizing ability. Others [27, 28] identified associations of several
dimensions of the ARSQ with alpha and theta oscillations during rest and with sleep latency.
These results suggest that the ARSQ assesses dimensions of ST as rather stable, trait-like char-
acteristics and provide first indications for construct validity with respect to neural correlates
of ST as assessed by this questionnaire in nonclinical populations.
The ST lab phenotypes assessed by the ARSQ 2.0 can be divided into those measuring par-
ticularities of the ST process (“Discontinuity of Mind”, “Visual” and “Verbal Thought”) and
those measuring specific contents of ST. They can also be expected to vary in their degree of
association with mental health indicators and cognitive traits. For example, “Discontinuity of
Mind” describes a state characterized by the perceived lack of control over ones’ thoughts,
thereby reflecting a dysfunctional thought process that is common to many psychological dis-
orders. Diaz et al. [23, 24] have shown that this ST dimension was positively correlated with
mental health problems and negatively with self-transcendence, a self-oriented process associ-
ated with spiritual traits or meditation. Regarding “Visual” and “Verbal” Thought, previous
research has shown that worry is predominantly experienced in a more abstract-verbal form
rather than in a concrete-visual imaginary form [29]. Abstract-verbal worry leads to higher
anxiety than concrete-visual worry, and this reduced concreteness in thinking has been shown
to exert negative effects on problem solving and emotion regulation [29]. Within the content
dimensions, “Comfort” directly describes a positive state of well-being, which had a negative
relationship with “Discontinuity of Mind” and with mental health problems, and a positive
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relationship with good sleep quality in the study by Diaz et al. [23]). “Theory of Mind”, which
signalizes mentalizing properties in terms of thinking about others, is considered a functional
cognitive ability that is important for social aspects in life [26]. In contrast, “Health Concern”
includes worries about health and feeling ill and may therefore show a link to anxious states
and traits [24]. “Sleepiness” may characterize the perception of a transient state of tiredness
but also a more enduring condition of bodily or mental exhaustion which is also common in
many psychological disorders. In the study by Diaz et al. [23], “Sleepiness” was linked to low
mental well-being and to EEG biomarkers of low vigilance and drowsiness. Other dimensions,
such as “Somatic Awareness”, appear to be more indirectly linked to mental health by con-
structs such as mindfulness (here: being aware of one’s bodily reactions, or somatosensory
attention, cf. [30]) whereas “Planning” describes both elements of mindlessness, worries, and
future orientation. Finally, similarly to “Theory of Mind”, “Self” appears to be most closely
related to the concept of self-reflection, which has generally not been associated with adverse
mental health outcomes [29, 31]. In sum, different associations with markers of mental health
and functionality of cognitive traits can be expected for the various ST dimensions measured
with the ARSQ 2.0.
Associations between SGT and mood have so far only been investigated within the same
assessment context (e.g., during a lab session or during daily life) but not across contexts. In
the prominent large-scale daily life experience sampling study by Killingsworth & Gilbert [12],
participants reported lower levels of happiness when their minds were wandering than when
they were not. Others, however [10, 19, 32, 33], found that the negative effect of MW on mood
disappeared when differentiating between MW and perseverative cognition, such as rumina-
tion or worry, and posit that MW only becomes maladaptive when it takes a rigid form of per-
severative cognition [10].
Particularly rumination, the tendency to repetitively and passively focus on the meanings,
causes and consequences of one’s current feelings of distress, problems, and other negative
aspects of the self, has been identified as a reliable risk factor for the development and course
of depression [34–38], but also as a transdiagnostic risk factor for predicting various types of
mainly internalising, but also externalising psychopathologies and their comorbidities [37, 39].
Momentary rumination in daily life has been shown to deteriorate mood [40] and to enhance
cortisol secretion over the day [36]. Furthermore, instability of daily life rumination impacted
the long-term clinical depression course in remitted depressed patients [38]. Research also
suggests that not all aspects of rumination are equally problematic. For example, Treynor et al.
[41] defined the “depressive brooding” and “reflective pondering” subtypes of rumination, of
which only the former is considered to have detrimental effects on mood. Furthermore, partic-
ularly perceived uncontrollability of rumination (i.e., thoughts about how difficult it is to con-
trol or interrupt ruminative thoughts)—as a kind of “second order-” or “meta-”rumination—
appears to be most strongly associated with depressive symptomatology [42].
Aim of the present study was to investigate the stability of subdomains of the ARSQ 2.0 as a
measure of task-free rest-related ST in the lab, as well as associations of these subdomains with
a restricted number of mental health indicators and cognitive vulnerability and protective
traits. Due to previous research [10, 22–25, 30, 33, 35, 39] we expected a number of subdimen-
sions (Discontinuity of Mind, Planning, Comfort, Health Concern, and Verbal Thought) to be
linked to mental health indicators and to the maladaptive trait component of brooding rumi-
nation, whereas others were expected to be predicted by the more adaptive component of
reflective rumination (Theory of Mind, Self) or trait mindfulness (Somatic Awareness). Fur-
thermore, we aimed to assess the potential of ARSQ 2.0 subdomains to predict MW, perceived
uncontrollability of rumination (RUM) as a form of perseverative negative cognition, and
mood in daily life. We hypothesized that the more dysfunctional subdomains described above
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should particularly be linked to daily life RUM. Finally, we aimed to assess possible mediating
effects of daily life MW and RUM on the relationship between ARSQ 2.0 lab dimensions and
daily life mood. The latter aspect is of particular importance, because mediation models pro-
vide insight into the pathways by which a specific ST lab dimension, conceptualized as a trait-
like distal predictor, may affect mood outcomes in daily life.
Materials and methods
Participants
We recruited 45 university students to take part in a study on SGT and mood in the laboratory
and in daily life. Two participants had to be excluded due to excessive missing data, resulting
in a final sample of 43 participants aged 19–32 (26 women, 17 men; Mage = 21.74 years,
SD = 3.14). Participants were recruited using social networks and mailing lists for students of
the University of Mannheim. They were compensated for their time with four hours of course
credit. For the completion of at least 90% of the electronic daily life assessments, participants
received an additional payment of 20 Euros as a bonus. All procedures performed in this study
were in accordance with the the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or compa-
rable ethical standards. The experimental protocol was approved by the University of Mann-
heim Ethics Committee. All individual participants provided written informed consent.
Procedure
Fig 1 shows the design of the study. The study consisted of three phases: A first laboratory ses-
sion (day 1), followed by five days of ambulatory assessment (days 2–6), and a final laboratory
session (day 7). On day 1, participants received written information about the study and signed
the informed consent form. Demographic data was collected and participants filled out a num-
ber of baseline questionnaires. Subsequently, ST was assessed in the laboratory using the
ARSQ 2.0 procedure described below.
At the end of the session on day 1, participants received detailed instructions on the use of
the electronic device (smartphone) for the daily life assessment of MW, rumination, and mood
taking place over the next five days (description see below). After performing the ambulatory
assessment (AA), participants returned to the laboratory for a repeated measurement of ST on
Fig 1. Schematic representation of the study procedure. PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect; ARSQ
2.0 = Amsterdam Resting-State Questionnaire Version 2.0.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184488.g001
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day 7. They also returned the smartphone, filled out a short follow-up questionnaire relating to
the AA, and received their compensation.
Questionnaires
Prior to the laboratory assessment of ST, participants completed baseline questionnaires to
assess levels of depressive and anxiety symptoms as well as dispositional rumination and
mindfulness.
Center for epidemiological studies-depression scale (CES-D). The CES-D ([43], Ger-
man version [44]) is a 20-item measure that asks to rate how often over the past week one
experienced symptoms associated with depression, such as sadness, restless sleep and poor
appetite. Response options range from 0 to 3 for each item (0 = rarely or none of the time,
1 = some or a little of the time, 2 = a moderate amount of time, 3 = most or all of the time).
Scores range from 0 to 60, with high scores indicating greater depressive symptoms. A cut-off
of 16+ has been proposed to denote individuals at heightened risk for depression [43, 45]. The
CES-D has been widely used in epidemiological and clinical studies and has proved to have
good psychometric properties. In the present study, the internal consistency of the CES-D was
α = .85.
State-trait anxiety inventory, trait subscale (STAI-T). The trait subscale of the STAI by
Spielberger (German version [45]) measures anxiety as an individual difference variable, i.e.,
as the general tendency to react with anxiety, using 20 statements. Subjects are requested to
indicate on a four point scale (1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = almost always)
how they generally feel. The STAI has demonstrated good reliability, concurrent and construct
validity [45]. The German manual includes norm values for different subgroups, with a raw
value of 56 corresponding to a T-value of 70 in young adult populations. In the present study,
the internal consistency of the STAI-T was α = .89.
Response styles questionnaire (RSQ_10D). Trait rumination was measured using the
ten-item German version [46] of the Response Styles Questionnaire by Treynor et al. [41].
The questionnaire includes two components of rumination, namely brooding (the tendency
to passively ruminate on one’s deficits and problems, e.g. “why can’t I handle things better”)
and self-reflection (neutrally thinking about one’s self, e.g. “I go someplace alone to think
about my feelings”). Each component is reflected by five items, with scores ranging from 1 to
20. Subjects are requested to indicate what they generally think or do when they feel down,
sad, or depressed on a four-point scale (1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = almost
always). The RSQ-10 has shown good psychometric properties [46]. In the present study, the
internal consistencies of brooding and reflection were α = .72 and α = .71, respectively.
Mindful attention and awareness scale. Trait mindfulness was measured using the
German version [47] of the Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale [30]. The 15-item scale
assesses the general tendency to be attentive to and aware of present-moment experiences.
The wording of all items is directed towards a “mindless” disposition, for example “I rush
through activities without being really attentive to them”. Subjects indicate how often they
have experiences of “mindlessness” on a six-point scale (1 = almost always, 2 = very frequently,
3 = somewhat frequently, 4 = somewhat infrequently, 5 = very infrequently, 6 = almost never).
Consequently, higher scores signify more mindfulness. In the present study, the internal con-
sistency of the MAAS was α = .86.
Laboratory assessments
During the laboratory sessions on days 1 and 7, participants were first instructed to assume a
comfortable and relaxed sitting position in front of the computer. ST in the lab was assessed
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using the procedure described by Diaz et al. [24]. Experiment and instructions were presented
using the open source software OpenSesame [48]. Participants were informed that the experi-
ment is about thoughts and feelings that may be experienced during rest. They were asked to
relax and to keep their eyes closed for five minutes, to move as little as possible and to try not
to fall asleep. When the five minutes were up, the participants heard a beep and were allowed
to open their eyes again. They were then asked to fill out the ARSQ 2.0 [24] (see below).
Amsterdam resting-state questionnaire. The Amsterdam Resting-State Questionnaire
(ARSQ 2.0; [24]) was developed as a standardized instrument to capture ST experiences during
the resting state. It allows the quantitative assessment of thoughts and feelings along ten
dimensions of ST, namely “Discontinuity of Mind”, “Theory of Mind”, “Self”, “Planning”,
“Sleepiness”, “Comfort”, “Somatic Awareness”, “Health Concern”, “Visual Thought”, and
“Verbal Thought”. The ten-factor model of MW exhibits acceptable fit [24]. Each factor is
specified by three items, resulting in 30 items in the model. The ARSQ 2.0 additionally encom-
passes 19 non-factor items and five items to assess response validity, resulting in a total of 54
items. The items are scored on a five-point scale (0 = completely disagree, 1 = disagree, 2 = nei-
ther agree nor disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = completely agree). Scores for each dimension are com-
puted based on the mean of the raw responses of the respective factor items.
The item order was randomized, except for the validation items. The data was screened in
accordance with the validation items, which indicated that all participants had their eyes closed
during the experiment and were able to rate the statements (rating 3), and were sufficiently
motivated to participate (rating 2). However, on day 1 four participants (9.3%) indicated
that they had difficulty remembering their thoughts (rating 3). On day 7, this applied to two
(4.7%) participants.
The German translation of the ARSQ 2.0 was made available by the authors of the original
instrument (see Supporting Information S1 File).
Ambulatory assessment
The ambulatory assessment (AA) was carried out using Motorola Moto G 2nd Generation
smartphones and the software movisensXS, Version 0.6.3862 (movisens GmbH, Karlsruhe,
Germany). The AA was performed over five consecutive days and always comprised a week-
end in addition to three weekdays. As participants began the study on different weekdays,
sequence effects were avoided since the weekend could fall in the beginning, middle or end of
the assessment period.
Participants started the AA procedure on the day immediately following the first laboratory
session. There were ten assessments each day, with the first assessment taking place at 9.00 a.m.
and the remaining assessments taking place between 10.00 a.m. and 10.00 p.m. at random time
points at least 60 minutes apart. Each assessment was announced by an acoustic signal or vibra-
tion alert, and participants were asked to immediately respond to the questions, which took two
to three minutes to complete. If participants were unable to respond at the time of the signal,
they could press a button to delay their response by 15 minutes. If they failed to respond to the
alarm, it was repeated five times within the space of five minutes. If the participant rejected the
alarm or ultimately failed to respond to it, the assessment was saved as missing. Participants
were provided with written instructions regarding the electronic diary procedure.
Mind wandering (MW, AA). Each time a participant was assessed by the electronic diary,
they were first asked the mind-wandering question (derived from [12]): “At the time of the
beep, were you thinking about something other than what you were currently doing?”. Partici-
pants responded on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (I was completely on task) to 7 (I was
completely off task).
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Perceived uncontrollability of rumination (RUM, AA). Second, ruminative self-focus
was captured with the item “At the moment, I am stuck on negative thoughts and cannot dis-
engage from them”. This item was rated on a scale from 1 to 7, and captured the uncontrolla-
bility facet of rumination (AA; cf. [42]).
Positive (PA) and negative (NA) affect (AA). Finally, participants were asked to rate
their current mood on 12 items balanced in valence (i.e. positive and negative) and arousal
(i.e. the degree of activation). The items were based on the Positive and Negative Affect Sched-
ule (PANAS; [49]) and previous experience-sampling studies [50, 51]. PA was measured using
the words: cheerful, energetic, enthusiastic, satisfied, relaxed, and calm; NA was assessed with
the words: upset, irritated, nervous, listless, down, and bored. Participants were asked to rate
the items on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). PA and NA scores were
calculated based on the sum of the respective scale items.
Data analysis
To determine the stability of the ARSQ 2.0 ST lab dimensions, we first computed Pearson cor-
relations of the ten dimensions assessed on days 1 and 7. We additionally used equivalence
testing [52] to demonstrate mean equivalence in two dependent samples. Equivalence tests
provide statistical support for the null hypothesis, that is, evidence for “no difference”. They
require the definition of a minimum substantial effect, which is the lowest effect size consid-
ered as consequential. We selected Δ = .3 as a minimum substantial effect, based on Cohen’s
(1988) classification of a medium effect. The SPSS custom dialog file for the dependent/paired
samples equivalence test was downloaded from http://www.dr-rene-weber.de (Software &
Materials), and analyses were carried out according to the instructions by Weber and Popova
[52].
With regard to the other analyses, data were analyzed with Hierarchical Linear Models
(HLMs), as the data exhibited a multilevel structure with assessments (level 1) nested within
participants (level 2). When specifying the fixed part of the models, the respective assessment
day was always entered as a fixed effect, that is either days 1 and 7 (categorical variable, coded
1 and 2) in models regarding laboratory data, or days 2 to 6 (continuous variable, coded 1 to 5)
in models pertaining to daily life assessments. The daily life models also included time over the
day (continuous variable, exact time since first assessment) as a fixed effect. Finally, all HLMs
included a random intercept to indicate that the mean levels of the respective dependent vari-
able may vary between individuals.
In all models that include the daily life measures of MW and RUM (i.e., predictive effects of
ST lab dimensions on MW and RUM, meditation models), we used the time-lagged scores
(measured at t-1) of MW and RUM and the non-lagged scores (measured at time t) of the
mood outcomes. These analyses were performed with IBM SPSS Version 22.
The mediation analyses for multilevel models were conducted using the procedures
described in Bauer, Preacher, and Gil [53] using a lower level mediation model (2-1-1).
Thereby the effect of a level 2 predictor is mediated and the mediator is a level 1 variable. Fit-
ting the model is done by stacking the dataset and using the procedure PROC MIXED from
SAS Software Version 9.4. For calculating and testing the indirect and total effects we used a
modification of the SAS macro INDTEST provided by Bauer on the Web at http://supp.apa.
org/psycarticles/supplemental/met_11_2_142/met_11_2_142_supp.html. In addition, a
Monte Carlo procedure implemented in this macro based on 100,000 samples yields 95% con-
fidence intervals around the indirect and the total effect. Zero falling outside the interval indi-
cates that the respective effect is significant.
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Results
Descriptive analyses and compliance with ambulatory assessment
The means and standard deviations as well as the minimum and maximum values obtained on
all variables assessed in the laboratory and in daily life are presented in Table 1. For descriptive
purposes, Table 1 presents aggregated scores for the ten ARSQ 2.0 ST lab dimensions, averaged
over the two days of laboratory assessment (day 1, day 7). Similarly, aggregated scores for
MW, RUM, and PA and NA in daily life were calculated by averaging the individual scores per
person over the five days of ambulatory assessment (day 2 to day 6). As shown in Table 1, the
percentage of participants reporting elevated depression scores (CES-D) was 9.3%, and that of
those with elevated anxiety scores was 7.0%.
In total, 1.964 out of 2.150 daily life assessments (5 days  10 assessments per day  43 par-
ticipants) were completed, resulting in a compliance rate of 91.3%. In a follow-up question-
naire after ambulatory assessment, 22 participants (51.2%) reported that the assessments were
not at all unpleasant, 18 participants (41.9%) found them slightly unpleasant, and two partici-
pants (4.7%) quite unpleasant (one participant neglected to answer the question). When partic-
ipants were asked whether they had altered their behavior due to assessments, the majority (31
participants, 72.1%) indicated that they had almost never done so, with only one participant
(2.3%) reporting that this had almost always been the case.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the main variables assessed in the laboratory and in daily life (N = 43).
M/N SD/% Min Max
Laboratory assessments
Discontinuity of Minda 2.11 0.75 0.17 3.50
Theory of Minda 2.30 0.72 0.50 3.67
Selfa 2.37 0.83 0.33 4.00
Planninga 2.45 0.87 0.83 4.00
Sleepinessa 1.14 0.64 0.00 2.50
Comforta 2.95 0.69 0.00 4.00
Somatic Awarenessa 2.45 0.90 0.50 4.00
Health Concerna 0.52 0.63 0.00 2.50
Visual Thoughta 2.61 0.78 0.67 3.83
Verbal Thoughta 1.39 0.85 0.00 3.50
Ambulatory assessments
Mind wanderingb 3.16 1.90 1 7
Uncontrollable ruminationb 1.90 1.37 1 7
Positive affectb 28.19 6.19 6 42






















Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies–Depression Scale (German version); STAI-T = Trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (German
version)
a The ten dimensions of mind wandering were aggregated over the two assessment days.
b The daily-life variables were aggregated over the five assessment days.
c Raw value of 16+ indicates clinically relevant depressive symptom level [43].
d Raw value of 56+ corresponds to a T-value of 70+ in the age range of young adults [45].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184488.t001
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Stability of ST lab dimensions
Table 2 shows the retest coefficients and the results of equivalence testing between the first
(day 1) and second day (day 7) assessments of the ten ARSQ 2.0 ST lab dimensions. Moderate
to high retest correlations were obtained for all ST dimensions apart from Sleepiness. These
results provide a first indication of the correlative stability over time for nine out of ten of the
ST dimensions. Mean equivalence was shown for five of the ten dimensions: “Discontinuity of
Mind”, “Self”, “Sleepiness”, “Health Concern”, and “Verbal Thought” (see Table 2).
Prediction of ST lab dimensions by symptoms and trait measures
HLMs were used to assess the predictive value of depressive symptoms, trait anxiety, disposi-
tional brooding and reflective rumination, and trait mindfulness at baseline for the ten ST lab
dimensions measured at day 1 and day 7 (dependent variables). Results of these models are
shown in Table 3. The table presents the simple associations of respective predictors with ST
lab dimensions (i.e., separate models for each predictor, together with the fixed effect of assess-
ment day).
To account for possible collinearity among selected candidate predictors, we then used
backward elimination of predictors, by stepwise removing the predictor with the least signifi-
cant contribution to the model and retained all predictors in the model that significantly (p<
.05) contributed to the respective ARSQ 2.0 domain. Each stepwise regression analysis resulted
in only one remaining significant (p< .05) predictor per ST lab domain. Respective significant
predictors are marked in bold in Table 3.
According to the multiple regression analyses using backward selection, five out of the ten
ARSQ 2.0 dimensions were significantly predicted by depressive or anxiety symptom scores.
Higher symptom scores of depressive or anxiety symptoms predicted higher levels of “Discon-
tinuity of Mind”, “Planning”, and “Sleepiness”, and lower levels of “Comfort” and “Somatic
Table 2. Stability of the ARSQ 2.0 lab dimensions.
Retest-correlationsa Equivalence
testingb
ARSQ 2.0 dimension r t p
Discontinuity of Mind .485** 0.23 .019
Theory of Mind .488** 0.77 .065
Self .618** 0.37 .027
Planning .571** -1.17 .131
Sleepiness .169 -0.28 .022
Comfort .544** 1.86 .331
Somatic Awareness .595** 3.48 .862
Health Concern .586** 0.08 .013
Visual Thought .371* 0.81 .069
Verbal Thought .618** -0.55 .040
Note. ARSQ 2.0 = Amsterdam Resting State Questionnaire, Version 2.0 (Diaz et al., 2014, German version).
aPearson correlation coefficients between the first (day 1) and second (day 7) assessments of the ten
dimensions of mind wandering of the ARSQ 2.0.
* p < .05
** p < .01
bEquivalence testing for mean equivalence between the first (day 1) and second (day 7) assessments of the
ten dimensions of mind wandering of the ARSQ 2.0. Δ = .30 and df = 42 for each equivalence test.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184488.t002
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Awareness” (ps< .05). Furthermore, lower levels of dispositional mindfulness predicted
higher levels of “Discontinuity of Mind” (p< .05) in the simple regression analysis, but this
predictor was removed during the backward procedure. “Theory of Mind” and “Self” were nei-
ther linked to symptom scales nor to brooding or mindfulness. In contrast, higher levels of
these ST lab dimensions were significantly predicted by higher levels on the reflection subscale
of rumination (ps< .01). Finally, “Health Concern”, “Verbal Thought”, and “Visual Thought”
were not significantly predicted by any symptom or cognitive trait measure (all ps>.05).
Effects of ST lab dimensions on MW, rumination, and mood in daily life
In a next step, HLMs were used to determine whether ST in the lab predicted MW, RUM, and
mood in daily life. Here, the ten ST lab dimension assessments of the lab day preceding the AA
days (day 1) were used as predictors. MW, RUM (measured at time t-1), and PA and NA (mea-
sured at time t) in daily life served as dependent variables in separate models. All models
included random intercepts as well as time over the day and the assessment day as fixed effects
(see Method section).
As shown in Table 4, a mixed pattern of associations of ST lab dimensions with cognitive
and affective processes in daily life emerged. First, three lab dimensions, namely “Theory of
Mind”, “Somatic Awareness”, and “Visual Thought”, consistently yielded negative results, i.e.,
did not predict any of the daily life measures (ps>.05). Second, high levels of “Comfort” clearly
predicted positive daily life cognitive and mood outcomes (low levels of RUM and NA, and
Table 3. Hierarchical Linear Models on the Effect of Symptoms and Dispositional Traits on Mind Wandering Dimensions in the Laboratory (ARSQ
2.0, Day 1, Day7, backward regression).
Discontinuity of Mind Theory of Mind Self Planning Sleepiness
Fixed effect B SE p B SE p B SE p B SE p B SE p
CES-D depression 0.04 0.02 .021 0.01 0.02 .726 0.03 0.02 .157 0.04 0.02 .044 0.02 0.02 .368
STAI
anxiety
0.04 0.01 .002 0.01 0.01 .592 0.02 0.02 .230 0.05 0.01 < .001 0.02 0.01 .048
RSQ-10
Brooding
0.06 0.04 .121 0.03 0.04 .509 0.07 0.04 .110 0.09 0.05 .064 0.03 0.04 .486
RSQ-10
Reflection
0.02 0.04 .508 0.09 0.03 .009 0.13 0.03 < .001 0.05 0.04 .256 -0.02 0.03 .476
MAAS
Mindfulness
-0.02 0.01 .025 -0.00 0.01 .686 -0.01 0.01 .653 -0.02 0.01 .056 -0.00 0.01 .738
Comfort Somatic Awareness Health Concern Visual Thought Verbal Thought
Fixed effect B SE p B SE p B SE P B SE p B SE p
CES-D depression 0.08 0.01 < .001 -0.04 0.02 .048 0.02 0.02 .164 -0.02 0.02 .366 0.01 0.02 .685
STAI
anxiety
-0.05 0.01 < .001 -0.02 0.02 .336 0.02 0.01 .072 -0.01 0.02 .553 0.03 0.02 .068
RSQ-10
Brooding
-0.07 0.04 .058 -0.01 0.05 .774 0.02 0.04 .614 -0.01 0.04 .785 -0.01 0.05 .804
RSQ-10
Reflection
-0.03 0.03 .311 -0.00 0.04 .986 0.00 0.03 .884 -0.02 0.04 .555 0.05 0.04 .254
MAAS
Mindfulness
0.02 0.01 .052 0.02 0.01 .211 -0.00 0.01 .716 0.01 0.01 .678 -0.01 0.01 .554
Note. All models include random intercepts as well the assessment day as fixed effects. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies–Depression Scale;
STAI-T = Trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; RSQ-10 Brooding = Brooding subscale of the 10-item Response Styles Questionnaire; RSQ-10
Reflection = Reflection subscale of the 10-item Response Styles Questionnaire; MAAS = Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale. Models were based on
1,964 observations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184488.t003
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high levels of PA, ps.001). Third, higher levels of “Self” predicted higher levels of MW and
RUM (ps< .05), and higher levels of “Verbal Thought” predicted higher levels of RUM (p<
.05), but none of these dimensions predicted PA or NA in daily life (ps>.05). Finally, the
remaining dimensions, namely “Discontinuity of Mind”, “Planning”, “Sleepiness”, and
“Health Concern” were prospectively linked to higher amounts of MW and/or of RUM epi-
sodes, and to low PA and/or high NA (ps< .05) in daily life.
Mediation analyses
For those ST lab dimensions providing significant (p< .05) effects on both cognitive (MW
and/or RUM) and affective (PA and/or NA) outcomes in daily life (i.e., “Discontinuity of
Mind” and “Planning” on MW and PA; “Sleepiness” on MW, RUM, and NA; “Comfort” on
RUM, PA and NA, and “Health Concern” on RUM and NA, see Table 4), we fitted HLM
mediation models with PA or NA at time t as dependent variable, the respective ARSQ 2.0 lab
dimension as predictor, and the cognitive daily life variable (MW or RUM) as time t-1 media-
tor in separate analyses. Again, all models included random intercepts as well as time over the
day and the assessment day as fixed effects. A Monte Carlo procedure based on 100,000 sam-
ples was used to calculate a 95% confidence interval around the indirect and the total effect.
Zero falling outside the interval indicates that the respective effect is significant. Results are
shown in Table 5 (with MW as mediator) and Table 6 (with RUM as mediator).
As shown in Table 5, the indirect effect of ST lab dimensions on daily life mood mediated
by MW in daily life was non-significant in all models. Furthermore, “Discontinuity of Mind”
and “Planning” demonstrated a significant direct effect on PA, and “Sleepiness” on NA, and
the respective significant total effects were not increased by the inclusion of the indirect effect
via MW in these models. Therefore, the significant associations between “Discontinuity of
Mind”, “Planning”, and “Sleepiness” with mood in daily life were not mediated by daily life
MW.
A totally different picture emerged for RUM (see Table 6). Here, the effect of the mediator
RUM and the corresponding indirect effect of ST lab dimensions via RUM was significant in





positive affect (AA) negative affect (AA)
Fixed effect
B SE p B SE p B SE p B SE p
ARSQ2.0 dimensions (lab):
Discontinuity of Mind 0.28 0.12 .021 0.24 0.14 .103 -1.46 0.59 .016 1.17 0.64 .073
Theory of Mind 0.22 0.14 .120 -0.08 0.16 .625 1.06 0.68 .127 -1.00 0.73 .177
Self 0.26 0.11 .024 0.32 0.13 .019 -0.31 0.58 .598 0.59 0.61 .341
Planning 0.23 0.11 .043 0.22 0.13 .099 -1.29 0.53 .020 0.97 0.58 .103
Sleepiness 0.28 0.12 .028 0.42 0.14 .004 -0.82 0.63 .202 1.79 0.63 .006
Comfort -0.27 0.15 .086 -0.56 0.16 .001 2.76 0.67 < .001 -2.85 0.72 < .001
Somatic Awareness -0.14 0.12 .235 0.01 0.14 .957 0.84 0.58 .157 -0.58 0.62 .354
Health Concerns 0.05 0.17 .766 0.63 0.17 .001 -1.20 0.82 .145 1.94 0.83 .025
Visual Thought -0.11 0.12 .365 -0.21 0.13 .128 0.85 0.57 .145 -0.96 0.60 .116
Verbal Thought 0.23 0.12 .061 0.30 0.14 .039 -0.90 0.61 .147 1.11 0.63 .088
Note. All models included random intercepts as well as time over the day and the assessment day as fixed effects. Models were based on 1.759 (originally
1,964) observations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184488.t004
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all models (all ps< .01), and the total effect in the respective models was larger when the indi-
rect effect was accounted for than the direct effect of the respective lab dimension on daily life
Table 5. Mediation effects of daily life mind wandering on the associations between ARSQ 2.0 ST lab dimensions and daily life mood.
Positive affect Negative affect
Fixed effect B SE p Monte Carlo
95% CI
B SE p Monte Carlo
95% CI
DOM (lab)!MW (AA) 0.31 0.12 .015
MW (AA)!mood (AA) -0.07 0.07 .320
DOM (lab)!mood (AA) -1.47 0.61 .020
Indirect effect -0.02 0.03 .385 -0.08; 0.02
Total effect -1.49 0.61 .014 -2.72; -0.33
PLAN (lab)!MW (AA) 0.24 0.11 .040
MW (AA)!mood (AA) -0.07 0.07 .319
PLAN (lab)!mood (AA) -1.27 0.56 .028
Indirect effect -0.02 0.02 .407 -0.07; 0.07
Total effect -1.28 0.56 .022 -2.40; -0.22
SLEEP (lab)!MW (AA) 0.32 0.13 .017
MW (AA)!mood (AA) 0.04 0.06 .531
SLEEP (lab)!mood (AA) 1.82 0.65 .008
Indirect effect 0.01 0.02 .571 -0.03; 0.06
Total effect 1.83 0.65 .005 0.55; 3.12
Note. All models included random intercepts as well as time over the day and the assessment day as fixed effects. DOM = Discontinuity of Mind,
PLAN = Planning, SLEEP = Sleepiness (ARSQ 2.0 dimensions), MW = mind wandering, mood = positive or negative affect, as appropriate, lab = measured
in the laboratory session (day 1), AA = measured by ambulatory assessment (days 2–6).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184488.t005
Table 6. Mediating effects of uncontrollable rumination in daily life on the associations between ARSQ 2.0 ST lab dimensions and daily life mood.
Positive affect Negative affect
Fixed effect B SE p Monte Carlo
95% CI
B SE p Monte Carlo
95% CI
SLEEP (lab)!RUM (AA) 0.43 0.14 .003
RUM (AA)!mood (AA) 0.84 0.09 < .0001
SLEEP (lab)!mood (AA) 1.50 0.57 .013
Indirect effect 0.36 0.12 .004 0.13; 0.61
Total effect 1.86 0.65 .005 0.56; 3.15
COMFT (lab)!RUM (AA) -0.57 0.17 .002 -0.57 0.17 .002
RUM (AA)!mood (AA) -0.72 0.12 < .0001 0.84 0.09 < .0001
COMFT (lab)!mood (AA) 2.36 0.65 .0008 -2.45 0.66 .0006
Indirect effect 0.41 0.14 .003 0.16; 0.72 -0.48 0.15 .002 -0.78;-0.12
Total effect 2.77 0.71 < .0001 1.36; 4.12 -2.93 0.75 < .0001 -4.42;-1.45
HEALTH (lab)!RUM (AA) 0.67 0.17 .0004
RUM (AA)!mood (AA) 0.83 0.09 < .0001
HEALTH (lab)!mood (AA) 1.33 0.77 .092
Indirect effect 0.56 0.16 .0004 0.27; 0.88
Total effect 1.89 0.88 .031 0.15; 3.62
Note. All models included random intercepts as well as time over the day and the assessment day as fixed effects. DOM = Discontinuity of Mind,
SLEEP = Sleepiness, COMFT = Comfort, HEALTH = Health Concerns (ARSQ 2.0 dimensions), RUM = uncontrollable rumination, lab = measured in the
laboratory session (day 1), AA = measured by ambulatory assessment (days 2–6)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184488.t006
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mood. Thereby, the association of “Comfort” with PA and NA, and the association of “Sleepi-
ness” and “Health Concern” with NA in daily life were significantly mediated by lagged daily
life RUM.
Discussion
The present study aimed to evaluate the stability and ecological validity of a laboratory resting
state ST procedure. For this purpose, we employed a recently developed questionnaire, the
ARSQ 2.0 [24], to assess several ST dimensions during the resting state in two laboratory ses-
sions, which were separated by five consecutive days of electronic ambulatory assessment in
daily life.
Stability of ST lab dimensions
Overall, ST dimensions assessed in the lab appeared to be rather stable over time. We found
that the vast majority of the ARSQ 2.0 dimensions exhibited moderate to high retest correla-
tions over a one-week interval. Our results are therefore consistent with findings of stable
retest correlations over short [23, 25] and longer intervals of up to 32 months [24] with the
ARSQ 2.0. We additionally used equivalence testing [52] and identified equivalence for “Dis-
continuity of Mind”, “Self”, “Sleepiness”, “Health Concern”, and “Verbal Thought”. This sug-
gests that the degree to which individuals are concerned with these aspects during ST is stable
across time. With regard to the other ST dimensions, it is possible that we could not show
equivalence because the sample size was too small [52].
Prediction of ST lab dimensions by mental health symptoms and
cognitive traits
Our analyses revealed that five out of the ten ST lab dimensions were predicted by levels of
depressive and/or anxiety symptoms. Individuals scoring high on one of these symptom scales
reported higher levels of “Discontinuity of Mind”, Planning”, and “Sleepiness”, and lower levels
of “Comfort” and “Somatic Awareness” during the 5-min resting interval in the lab. These
results corroborate those by Diaz et al. [23, 24] showing that a number of phenotypes of resting
state cognitions assessed by the ARSQ 2.0 are associated with mental health-related symptoms.
In the simple analysis, “Discontinuity of Mind” was furthermore predicted by dispositional
mindfulness. Individuals scoring low in dispositional mindfulness reported less control over
their thoughts, i.e. a higher tendency to have busy thoughts, rapidly switching thoughts, and
difficulties holding on to one’s thoughts during the lab resting-state session. The construct of
mindfulness has up to now mainly been contrasted with MW and the two have been proposed
to represent roughly opposing constructs [54]. Trait mindfulness has been shown to negatively
correlate with several indicators of MW such as trait mind wandering, self-reported task-unre-
lated thoughts and SART errors in a lab study [54], and Ottaviani & Couyoumdjian [19]
showed trait mindfulness to be inversely related to MW in daily life one year later. In the con-
text of ST, Diaz et al. [24] showed that specifically the “Discontinuity of Mind” dimension was
negatively correlated to the construct of “self-transcendence”, a self-oriented process associ-
ated with spiritual traits such as meditation. Interestingly, both the MAAS, used as a measure
of mindfulness in the present study, and the “Discontinuity of Mind” subfacet of the ARSQ 2.0
appear to most closely capture the “nondistractability” versus “distractability” facets of mind-
fulness and SGT, respectively, making the particular association between these constructs
plausible [54]. However, in the multiple model, dispositional mindfulness showed no indepen-
dent contribution to the explanation of “Discontinuity of Mind”, probably due to the former’s
overlap with indicators of mental health. This is consistent with prior research showing that
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mindfulness–measured as a trait or in the context of mindfulness-based interventions–has a
strong link to health and psychological well-being [30, 55].
The fact that we investigated a nonclinical sample may have influenced the associations
between habitual symptoms/traits and ST lab phenotypes. This may especially be true for
“Health Concern”, originally included to capture the extreme preoccupation with health status
often identified in clinical samples [24], for which we identified no significant effect of anxiety
symptom levels. As we observed particularly low levels on this lab dimension in the present
study, it is possible that future research with high risk or clinical samples may instead detect a
stronger association with mental health symptomatology, particularly with anxiety symptoms.
Two further ST lab phenotypes, namely “Theory of Mind” and “Self”, were not predicted by
mental health symptoms but instead by the RSQ-10 reflection subscale, thereby confirming
our hypothesis that these MW dimensions appear to be linked to a more functional disposition
of self-reflection [41].
Finally, vivid and concrete visual mental imagery—in contrast to more abstract inner
verbal thought processing—has been found to be related to positive mental health and
reduced depressive symptoms [56]. However, none of these lab dimensions were substan-
tially predicted by any of the symptom or cognitive trait measures in the present study.
Apart from the rather low intensity of Visual Thought reported in this study, this ST lab
dimension could represent a more heterogeneous phenotype with regard to the possible
experience of positive and/or negative images and past versus future-oriented visual
thoughts, with all of these aspects showing differential associations with positive and nega-
tive mental health aspects [56].
Effects of ST lab dimensions on MW, rumination, and mood in daily life
Three out of the ten ST lab dimensions (“Theory of Mind”, “Somatic Awareness”, and “Visual
Thought”) did not predict any daily life measure of MW, RUM, or mood. Therefore, these
dimensions—or their operationalization by the ARSQ 2.0—are either unrelated to respective
daily life experiences per se or their capacity to predict similar constructs across settings is
short-termed. Furthermore, the dimensions “Self” and “Verbal Thought” predicted daily life
cognitions, but not mood. The remaining resting-state ST phenotypes, namely “Discontinuity
of Mind”, “Planning”, “Sleepiness”, “Comfort”, and “Health Concern”, significantly predicted
daily life cognitions and mood.
Among these, only “Comfort”, was clearly linked to positive daily life outcomes. Individuals
who indicated that they felt comfortable, relaxed and happy during the rest session in the lab
reported low levels of RUM and NA, and high levels of PA in daily life. Thereby, this lab
dimension of ST was strongly connected with daily life indicators of low cognitive vulnerabil-
ity and of good psychological health. Together with the fact that “Comfort” scores were pre-
dicted by low symptom levels, these findings confirm results by Diaz et al. [23], but also extend
previous research by demonstrating prospective ecological validity of this dimension, indicat-
ing its trait-like properties.
In contrast, the sense of having little control over one’s thoughts (i.e. higher scores on “Dis-
continuity of Mind”) seems to translate to a greater incidence of MW and low mood in daily
life, thereby supporting and expanding previous findings by indicating proposed that MW
reflects the processing of thoughts with high personal salience [57]. Indeed, Andrews-Hanna
et al. [58] identified Personal Significance as one of three major dimensions for the classifica-
tion of thought content during SGT, which encompasses, for example, thoughts characterized
as self-relevant and goal-oriented, thereby corresponding well to this ST dimension. Further-
more, “Self” predicted RUM, but not PA and NA. While the latter could be expected due to
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the identified connection of this ST dimension with a more dysfunctional ST phenotype con-
nected with negative daily life experiences [23, 24].
Individuals whose thoughts in the laboratory focused on their own behavior and feelings
(i.e. higher scores on “Self”) also engaged in more MW and RUM in daily life. The former is
consistent with prior observations with regard to the content of MW episodes. For example, it
has been a more adaptive component of habitual self-reflection [29, 41], its strong positive
association particularly with RUM during daily life was at first sight counter-intuitive. How-
ever, in the study by Diaz et al. [24], this ARSQ 2.0 dimension, as most others, was negatively
correlated with Cloninger et al.´s [59] temperamental factor of self-directedness, the ability to
govern behavior according to situational demands and to adapt and regulate one’s behavior to
fit situations in accord with his/her chosen goals. Self-directedness has been described as a
marker of executive functions that could protect individuals from depression [60]. In the study
by Diaz et al. [24], “Self” was also negatively related to persistence, a tendency towards self-
confidence and perseverance. Altogether, our results suggest that while “Self” is linked to nega-
tive perseverative thought during daily life, this does at the same time not appear to affect
mood, thereby suggesting the involvement of protective mechanisms, which should be clari-
fied in future research.
Individuals whose thoughts revolved around future plans and problem solving (i.e., those
with higher scores on “Planning”) engaged in more MW in daily life. Stawarczyk et al. [61]
found that thoughts during MW were temporally and functionally oriented towards the future,
especially when participants were induced to think about personal goals before completing a
mind-wandering task. Additionally, MW facilitates the integration of past and present experi-
ences for the purposes of future planning [6]. Finally, Song and Wang [62] argued that MW
episodes are strongly associated with one’s self and plans to cope with upcoming events, which
also supports our observation that high levels of “Planning” during ST in the lab have an
impact on MW in daily life. However, as mentioned above, “Planning” was also predicted by
higher symptom scores of anxiety, pointing to a dysfunctional component of this MW lab
dimension. Similarly, Diaz et al. (2014) identified negative associations with self-directedness
and cooperation. While “Planning” failed to predict RUM in our study, it was linked to lower
PA in daily life.
Individuals who reported more health-related concerns during rest experienced more fre-
quent periods of RUM as well as higher levels of NA during daily life. In contrast, “Health
Concern” was not significantly related to trait anxiety. As shown earlier, this ST lab dimension
reflects psychopathological aspects characteristic for a number of clinical populations [24]. It
will be important to investigate the longer-term ecological validity of this dimension in clinical
samples with different psychopathology in future research.
High levels of sleepiness in the lab also predicted more MW, RUM, and NA in daily life.
Previous studies have provided evidence for a positive association between MW and sleepiness
[9, 10, 63] as well as poor sleep quality [63]. Furthermore, Ottaviani and Couyoumdjian [19]
found that MW during the day significantly predicted difficulties falling asleep the following
night. Research on sleep deprivation has demonstrated that lack of sleep impairs attention and
working memory, as well as cognitive performances that depend on the prefrontal cortex, such
as executive control [64]. EEG evidence also indicated that particularly MW shares similarities
with states of drowsiness, characterized by decreased alertness and vigilance [65], letting the
authors conclude that sleep deprivation might lead to more MW during the day. Our results
provide further evidence indicating that sleepiness may promote MW, but also more specific
negative cognitive (RUM) and affective outcomes in daily life. These identified longer-term
negative effects of sleepiness in the lab on momentary experiences assessed days later are
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noteworthy; they suggest that this lab dimension describes a more enduring unfavorable con-
dition rather than a merely short-term, transient state of tiredness.
In contrast to “Visual Thought”, the “Verbal Thought” domain predicted more RUM dur-
ing daily life. Negative repetitive thoughts such as rumination and worry have been character-
ized by a more abstract-verbal than concrete-visual imagery form, and have been linked to
impaired problem solving and affect regulation [29]. Thereby, the present results provide evi-
dence for the ecological validity of the “Verbal Thought” dimension of the ARSQ 2.0.
Mediation effects of daily life cognitions
Finally, multilevel mediation models showed that the associations of a number of ST lab
dimensions, namely “Comfort”, “Sleepiness”, and “Health Concern”, with daily life mood
were substantially accounted for by the extent to which individuals tend to brood over negative
thoughts during daily life which they perceive as uncontrollable. In other models, we observed
that MW per se did not exhibit effects on the relationship between ST lab dimensions and daily
life mood. These results clearly highlight the necessity to account for thought contents when
assessing the functional outcomes of MW (cf. [66]) and to differentiate between MW and neg-
ative perseverate cognition such as rumination [10, 32, 33]. In this context, it has to be consid-
ered that MW is a broad construct comprising heterogeneous phenomena that may include
adaptive and maladaptive components. Recent studies therefore recommend to assess more
specific subqualities of MW (and other SGTs), such as intentionality, time orientation, intru-
siveness, and more specific contents [15, 16, 20]. The missing mediation effect of MW in our
study may have resulted from a lack of specification of possible subqualities of MW. In con-
trast, the association between a number of ST lab dimensions with daily life mood was clearly
mediated by perseverative negative thought (RUM), characterized by more specific negatively
valenced thought contents, which may themselves be the product of ST or MW in daily life.
Thereby, the results of the ambulatory assessment study part provide external validation for
(mal-)adaptive aspects of specific ST categories as assessed with the ARSQ 2.0.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our data support the assumption that laboratory assessments of ST components
with the ARSQ 2.0 show acceptable stability as well as meaningful associations with individual
differences in mental health symptoms and cognitive traits. Furthermore, we demonstrated
ecological validity for a number of ST lab dimensions by establishing a link between specific
thought process and thought content components of spontaneous thought episodes in the lab
and the extent of MW, negative perseverative thought, and mood in daily life, and by identify-
ing significant mediational effects of dysfunctional daily life cognition on the association
between a number of ST lab dimensions and mood. Thereby, our results support the view that
while unconstrained ST during rest (as assessed by the ARSQ 2.0) and task-unrelated thoughts
during external demands or activities (MW) may be differentiated, they share important fea-
tures, such as being decoupled from ongoing perceptual input and internally focused, being
supported by the same underlying mechanism (unguided subject driven mental states), and
being connected to identical or overlapping neural networks such as the DMN [1, 2, 67].
With regard to the observed mediation effect of RUM, the present study is the first showing
a probable pathway by which more distal trait-like ST dimensions of the ARSQ 2.0 may affect
mood, and particularly NA, in daily life. This finding is also in accordance with the conceptual
Research Domain Criteria Project (RDoC) framework [68], in which rumination is included
as a key component of the Negative Valence Systems construct of Loss [69].
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In a next step, the investigation of ARSQ 2.0 dimensions in clinical compared to non-clini-
cal populations will allow to shed further light on the associations of these ST lab phenotypes
with mental health indicators, vulnerability traits, and daily life experiences. In this context,
the ARSQ 2.0 could possibly help to target maladaptive aspects of ST during the resting state,
thereby identifying susceptibility towards negative mental health conditions and cognitive vul-
nerability, and could be used as an outcome measure in interventions aiming at reducing
spontaneous maladaptive thought (cf.[70]). A further step in assessing the construct validity of
respective ST phenotypes would be to examine their associations with more basic psychologi-
cal and neurobiological functioning in clinical and in high-risk groups across traditional diag-
nostic boundaries, e.g., within the RDoC framework [68].
Limitations
The study had some limitations which we want to acknowledge. First, the ARSQ 2.0 [24] only
allows the retrospective assessment of participants’ thoughts and feelings during ST episodes
and, thus, could be subject to recall bias. With this instrument, it would have been unfeasible
to interrupt participants’ five minutes of rest to concurrently assess the thought content of ST.
As participants completed the ARSQ 2.0 promptly after the resting period, we believe that we
obtained satisfactorily valid measurements of the thought content of ST.
Second, the sample was restricted to university students. Therefore, our results may not
generalize to other populations.
Third, and particularly important, the sample size was only moderate. This may have
resulted in some non-significant or marginally significant results due to a lack of statistical
power in the present study. Connected herewith, we did not generally correct for multiple test-
ing in the present study. This was on the one hand due to the fact that we had established pre-
liminary a priori hypotheses regarding the (dys-)functionality of specific subdomains of the
ARSQ and their possible associations with symptoms, cognitive traits, and subjective daily life
experiences. Furthermore, we considered possible multicollinearity of candidate predictors for
the ten ST lab dimensions by using backward elimination of nonsignificant predictors in our
regression analyses. Nevertheless, the investigation of larger, more representative samples is
clearly warranted to replicate the present findings. In this context, larger study samples would
also allow to investigate possible moderators on the relationship between ARSQ 2.0 lab dimen-
sions and cognitive and affective daily life measures. For example, research has shown that
mood worsening after MW is particularly seen in individuals scoring high in neuroticism [71]
or trait negative affect [2], cognitive reactivity, and brooding [72], and low in dispositional
mindfulness [72].
Finally, some attention should be paid to potential reactivity effects in ambulatory assess-
ment. The large number and frequency of assessments in daily life may have been a source of
irritation and increased the burden on participants. However, there is generally little evidence
for measurement reactivity in ambulatory assessment studies [73], and our participants
showed a high rate of compliance. Therefore, we conclude that neither the participants’ mood
nor the extent of MW in daily life was substantially biased by the five days of ambulatory
assessment.
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